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Beschreibung
Two treatises on memory which have come down to us from antiquity are Aristotle's "On memory and recollection" and Plotinus' "On perception and memory" (IV 6); the latter also wrote at length about memory in his "Problems connected with the soul" (IV 3-4, esp. 3.25-4.6). In both authors memory is treated as a 'modest' faculty: both authors assume the existence of a persistent subject to whom memory belongs; and basic cognitive capacities are assumed on which memory depends. In particular, both theories use phantasia (representation) to explain memory.
Aristotle takes representations to be changes in concrete living things which arise from actual perception. To be connected to the original perception the representation has to be taken as a (kind of) copy of the original experience this is the way Aristotle defines memory at the end of his investigation.
Plotinus does not define memory: he is concerned with the question of what remembers. This is of course the soul, which goes through different stages of incarnation and disincarnation. Since the disembodied soul can remember, so he does not have Aristotle's resources for explaining the continued presence of representations as changes in the concrete thing. Instead, he thinks that when acquiring a memory we acquire a capacity in respect of the object of the memory, namely to make it present at a later time.
Two treatises on memory which have come down to us from antiquity are Aristotle's "On memory and recollection" and Plotinus' "On perception and memory" (IV 6); the latter also wrote at length about memory in his "Problems connected with the soul" (IV 3-4, esp. 3.25-4.6). In both authors memory is treated as a 'modest' faculty: both authors assume the existence of a persistent subject to whom memory belongs; and basic cognitive capacities are assumed on which memory depends. In particular, both theories use phantasia (representation) to explain memory.
Aristotle takes representations to be changes in concrete living things which arise from actual perception. To be connected to the original perception the representation has to be taken as a (kind of) copy of the original experience this is the way Aristotle defines memory at the end of his investigation.
Plotinus does not define memory: he is concerned with the question of what remembers. This is of course the soul, which goes through different stages of incarnation and disincarnation. Since the disembodied soul can remember, so he does not have Aristotle's resources for explaining the continued presence of representations as changes in the concrete thing. Instead, he thinks that when acquiring a memory we acquire a capacity in respect of the object of the memory, namely to make it present at a later time.
Über den Autor
Richard A. H. King, University of Glasgow, UK.
Details
Erscheinungsjahr: 2016
Genre: Geisteswissenschaften, Kunst, Musik, Philosophie
Jahrhundert: Renaissance und Aufklärung
Rubrik: Geisteswissenschaften
Medium: Taschenbuch
Reihe: ISSN
Inhalt: XIV
266 S.
ISBN-13: 9783110481556
ISBN-10: 3110481553
Sprache: Englisch
Einband: Kartoniert / Broschiert
Autor: King, Richard A. H.
Auflage: 1. Auflage
Hersteller: De Gruyter
de Gruyter, Walter, GmbH
ISSN
Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, De Gruyter GmbH, Genthiner Str. 13, D-10785 Berlin, productsafety@degruyterbrill.com
Maße: 230 x 155 x 16 mm
Von/Mit: Richard A. H. King
Erscheinungsdatum: 11.07.2016
Gewicht: 0,42 kg
Artikel-ID: 103845734