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"Steve Tadelis's Game Theory is an ideal textbook for advanced undergraduates, and great preparation for graduate work. It provides a clear, self-contained, and rigorous treatment of all the key concepts, along with interesting applications; it also introduces key technical tools in a straightforward and intuitive way."--Drew Fudenberg, Harvard University
"Steven Tadelis is a leading scholar in applied game theory, and his expertise shines through in this excellent new text. Aimed at intermediate to advanced undergraduates, it presents and discusses the theory remarkably clearly, at both the intuitive and formal levels. One novel feature I like is its serious consideration of the decision theoretic foundations of game theory. Another is its transparent presentation of relatively recent topics and applications, such as reputations in asymmetric information games, legislative bargaining, and cheap talk communication."--Steve Matthews, University of Pennsylvania
"Steve Tadelis has written an up-to-date, comprehensive, yet reader-friendly introductory textbook to game theory. He explains difficult concepts in an exceptionally clear and simple way, making the book accessible to students with a minimal background in mathematics. The abundance of examples and illustrations, drawing from economics, political science, and business strategy, not only shows the wide range of applications of game theory, but also makes the book attractive and fun to read. Tadelis's book will undoubtedly become a reference textbook for a first course in game theory."--Francis Bloch, école Polytechnique
"These days, game theory plays an essential role not only in economics, but in many other branches of social and engineering science, as well as philosophy, biology, psychology, even law. In all these disciplines, students and instructors alike should welcome this excellent resource for mastering the key tools of modern game theory."--Peter Hammond, University of Warwick
"It's hard to write a game theory textbook that strikes a good balance between precision and accessibility. But Steve Tadelis has accomplished this juggling act, with style and humor besides."--Eric S. Maskin, Nobel Laureate in Economics, Harvard University
"Game theory is a powerful tool for understanding strategic behavior in business, politics, and other settings. Steve Tadelis's text provides an ideal guide, taking you from first principles of decision theory to models of bargaining, auctions, signaling, and reputation building in a style that is both rigorous and reader-friendly."--Jonathan Levin, Stanford University
"Game Theory fills a void in the literature, serving as a text for an advanced undergraduate--or masters-level class. It has more detail than most undergraduate texts, while still being accessible to a broad audience and stopping short of the more technical approach of PhD-level texts. This is a valuable book, written by a meticulous scholar who is an expert in the field."--Matthew O. Jackson, author of Social and Economic Networks
"This is a great text, just at the right level for fourth-year undergraduates. The style is just right and the exercises are of high quality. Flow and organization are major strengths of the book--I can follow the text almost as is for the class I teach."--Luca Anderlini, Georgetown University
"Steve Tadelis's Game Theory is an ideal textbook for advanced undergraduates, and great preparation for graduate work. It provides a clear, self-contained, and rigorous treatment of all the key concepts, along with interesting applications; it also introduces key technical tools in a straightforward and intuitive way."--Drew Fudenberg, Harvard University
"Steven Tadelis is a leading scholar in applied game theory, and his expertise shines through in this excellent new text. Aimed at intermediate to advanced undergraduates, it presents and discusses the theory remarkably clearly, at both the intuitive and formal levels. One novel feature I like is its serious consideration of the decision theoretic foundations of game theory. Another is its transparent presentation of relatively recent topics and applications, such as reputations in asymmetric information games, legislative bargaining, and cheap talk communication."--Steve Matthews, University of Pennsylvania
"Steve Tadelis has written an up-to-date, comprehensive, yet reader-friendly introductory textbook to game theory. He explains difficult concepts in an exceptionally clear and simple way, making the book accessible to students with a minimal background in mathematics. The abundance of examples and illustrations, drawing from economics, political science, and business strategy, not only shows the wide range of applications of game theory, but also makes the book attractive and fun to read. Tadelis's book will undoubtedly become a reference textbook for a first course in game theory."--Francis Bloch, école Polytechnique
"These days, game theory plays an essential role not only in economics, but in many other branches of social and engineering science, as well as philosophy, biology, psychology, even law. In all these disciplines, students and instructors alike should welcome this excellent resource for mastering the key tools of modern game theory."--Peter Hammond, University of Warwick
"It's hard to write a game theory textbook that strikes a good balance between precision and accessibility. But Steve Tadelis has accomplished this juggling act, with style and humor besides."--Eric S. Maskin, Nobel Laureate in Economics, Harvard University
"Game theory is a powerful tool for understanding strategic behavior in business, politics, and other settings. Steve Tadelis's text provides an ideal guide, taking you from first principles of decision theory to models of bargaining, auctions, signaling, and reputation building in a style that is both rigorous and reader-friendly."--Jonathan Levin, Stanford University
"Game Theory fills a void in the literature, serving as a text for an advanced undergraduate--or masters-level class. It has more detail than most undergraduate texts, while still being accessible to a broad audience and stopping short of the more technical approach of PhD-level texts. This is a valuable book, written by a meticulous scholar who is an expert in the field."--Matthew O. Jackson, author of Social and Economic Networks
"This is a great text, just at the right level for fourth-year undergraduates. The style is just right and the exercises are of high quality. Flow and organization are major strengths of the book--I can follow the text almost as is for the class I teach."--Luca Anderlini, Georgetown University
- Preface
- PART I Rational Decision Making
- Chapter 1 The Single-Person Decision Problem
- 1.1 Actions, Outcomes, and Preferences
- 1.1.1 Preference Relations
- 1.1.2 Payoff Functions
- 1.2 The Rational Choice Paradigm
- 1.3 Summary
- 1.4 Exercises
- Chapter 2 Introducing Uncertainty and Time
- 2.1 Risk, Nature, and Random Outcomes
- 2.1.1 Finite Outcomes and Simple Lotteries
- 2.1.2 Simple versus Compound Lotteries
- 2.1.3 Lotteries over Continuous Outcomes
- 2.2 Evaluating Random Outcomes
- 2.2.1 Expected Payoff: The Finite Case
- 2.2.2 Expected Payoff: The Continuous Case
- 2.2.3 Caveat: It’s Not Just the Order Anymore
- 2.2.4 Risk Attitudes
- 2.2.5 The St. Petersburg Paradox
- 2.3 Rational Decision Making with Uncertainty
- 2.3.1 Rationality Revisited
- 2.3.2 Maximizing Expected Payoffs
- 2.4 Decisions over Time
- 2.4.1 Backward Induction
- 2.4.2 Discounting Future Payoffs
- 2.5 Applications
- 2.5.1 The Value of Information
- 2.5.2 Discounted Future Consumption
- 2.6 Theory versus Practice
- 2.7 Summary
- 2.8 Exercises
- PART II Static Games of Complete Information
- Chapter 3 Preliminaries
- 3.1 Normal-Form Games with Pure Strategies
- 3.1.1 Example: The Prisoner’s Dilemma
- 3.1.2 Example: Cournot Duopoly
- 3.1.3 Example: Voting on a New Agenda
- 3.2 Matrix Representation: Two-Player Finite Game
- 3.2.1 Example: The Prisoner’s Dilemma
- 3.2.2 Example: Rock-Paper-Scissors
- 3.3 Solution Concepts
- 3.3.1 Assumptions and Setup
- 3.3.2 Evaluating Solution Concepts
- 3.3.3 Evaluating Outcomes
- 3.4 Summary
- 3.5 Exercises
- Chapter 4 Rationality and Common Knowledge
- 4.1 Dominance in Pure Strategies
- 4.1.1 Dominated Strategies
- 4.1.2 Dominant Strategy Equilibrium
- 4.1.3 Evaluating Dominant Strategy Equilibrium
- 4.2 Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Pure Strategies
- 4.2.1 Iterated Elimination and Common Knowledge of Rationality
- 4.2.2 Example: Cournot Duopoly
- 4.2.3 Evaluating IESDS
- 4.3 Beliefs, Best Response, and Rationalizability
- 4.3.1 The Best Response
- 4.3.2 Beliefs and Best-Response Correspondences
- 4.3.3 Rationalizability
- 4.3.4 The Cournot Duopoly Revisited
- 4.3.5 The “p-Beauty Contest”
- 4.3.6 Evaluating Rationalizability
- 4.4 Summary
- 4.5 Exercises
- Chapter 5 Pinning Down Beliefs: Nash Equilibrium
- 5.1 Nash Equilibrium in Pure Strategies
- 5.1.1 Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibrium in a Matrix
- 5.1.2 Evaluating the Nash Equilibria Solution
- 5.2 Nash Equilibrium: Some Classic Applications
- 5.2.1 Two Kinds of Societies
- 5.2.2 The Tragedy of the Commons
- 5.2.3 Cournot Duopoly
- 5.2.4 Bertrand Duopoly
- 5.2.5 Political Ideology and Electoral Competition
- 5.3 Summary
- 5.4 Exercises
- Chapter 6 Mixed Strategies
- 6.1 Strategies, Beliefs, and Expected Payoffs
- 6.1.1 Finite Strategy Sets
- 6.1.2 Continuous Strategy Sets
- 6.1.3 Beliefs and Mixed Strategies
- 6.1.4 Expected Payoffs
- 6.2 Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium
- 6.2.1 Example: Matching Pennies
- 6.2.2 Example: Rock-Paper-Scissors
- 6.2.3 Multiple Equilibria: Pure and Mixed
- 6.3 IESDS and Rationalizability Revisited
- 6.4 Nash’s Existence Theorem
- 6.5 Summary
- 6.6 Exercises
- PART III Dynamic Games of Complete Information
- Chapter 7 Preliminaries
- 7.1 The Extensive-Form Game
- 7.1.1 Game Trees
- 7.1.2 Imperfect versus Perfect Information
- 7.2 Strategies and Nash Equilibrium
- 7.2.1 Pure Strategies
- 7.2.2 Mixed versus Behavioral Strategies
- 7.2.3 Normal-Form Representation of Extensive-Form Games
- 7.3 Nash Equilibrium and Paths of Play
- 7.4 Summary
- 7.5 Exercises
- Chapter 8 Credibility and Sequential Rationality
- 8.1 Sequential Rationality and Backward Induction
- 8.2 Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium: Concept
- 8.3 Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium: Examples
- 8.3.1 The Centipede Game
- 8.3.2 Stackelberg Competition
- 8.3.3 Mutually Assured Destruction
- 8.3.4 Time-Inconsistent Preferences
- 8.4 Summary
- 8.5 Exercises
- Chapter 9 Multistage Games
- 9.1 Preliminaries
- 9.2 Payoffs
- 9.3 Strategies and Conditional Play
- 9.4 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria
- 9.5 The One-Stage Deviation Principle
- 9.6 Summary
- 9.7 Exercises
- Chapter 10 Repeated Games
- 10.1 Finitely Repeated Games
- 10.2 Infinitely Repeated Games
- 10.2.1 Payoffs
- 10.2.2 Strategies
- 10.3 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria
- 10.4 Application: Tacit Collusion
- 10.5 Sequential Interaction and Reputation
- 10.5.1 Cooperation as Reputation
- 10.5.2 Third-Party Institutions as Reputation Mechanisms
- 10.5.3 Reputation Transfers without Third Parties
- 10.6 The Folk Theorem: Almost Anything Goes
- 10.7 Summary
- 10.8 Exercises
- Chapter 11 Strategic Bargaining
- 11.1 One Round of Bargaining: The Ultimatum Game
- 11.2 Finitely Many Rounds of Bargaining
- 11.3 The Infinite-Horizon Game
- 11.4 Application: Legislative Bargaining
- 11.4.1 Closed-Rule Bargaining
- 11.4.2 Open-Rule Bargaining
- 11.5 Summary
- 11.6 Exercises
- PART IV Static Games of Incomplete Information
- Chapter 12 Bayesian Games
- 12.1 Strategic Representation of Bayesian Games
- 12.1.1 Players, Actions, Information, and Preferences
- 12.1.2 Deriving Posteriors from a Common Prior: A Player’s Beliefs
- 12.1.3 Strategies and Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
- 12.2 Examples
- 12.2.1 Teenagers and the Game of Chicken
- 12.2.2 Study Groups
- 12.3 Inefficient Trade and Adverse Selection
- 12.4 Committee Voting
- 12.5 Mixed Strategies Revisited: Harsanyi’s Interpretation
- 12.6 Summary
- 12.7 Exercises
- Chapter 13 Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- 13.1 Independent Private Values
- 13.1.1 Second-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
- 13.1.2 English Auctions
- 13.1.3 First-Price Sealed-Bid and Dutch Auctions
- 13.1.4 Revenue Equivalence
- 13.2 Common Values and the Winner’s Curse
- 13.3 Summary
- 13.4 Exercises
- Chapter 14 Mechanism Design
- 14.1 Setup: Mechanisms as Bayesian Games
- 14.1.1 The Players
- 14.1.2 The Mechanism Designer
- 14.1.3 The Mechanism Game
- 14.2 The Revelation Principle
- 14.3 Dominant Strategies and Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms
- 14.3.1 Dominant Strategy Implementation
- 14.3.2 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms
- 14.4 Summary
- 14.5 Exercises
- PART V Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information
- Chapter 15 Sequential Rationality with Incomplete Information
- 15.1 The Problem with Subgame Perfection
- 15.2 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
- 15.3 Sequential Equilibrium
- 15.4 Summary
- 15.5 Exercises
- Chapter 16 Signaling Games
- 16.1 Education Signaling: The MBA Game
- 16.2 Limit Pricing and Entry Deterrence
- 16.2.1 Separating Equilibria
- 16.2.2 Pooling Equilibria
- 16.3 Refinements of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Signaling Games
- 16.4 Summary
- 16.5 Exercises
- Chapter 17 Building a Reputation
- 17.1 Cooperation in a Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
- 17.2 Driving a Tough Bargain
- 17.3 A Reputation for Being “Nice”
- 17.4 Summary
- 17.5 Exercises
- Chapter 18 Information Transmission and Cheap Talk
- 18.1 Information Transmission: A Finite Example
- 18.2 Information Transmission: The Continuous Case
- 18.3 Application: Information and Legislative Organization
- 18.4 Summary
- 18.5 Exercises
- Chapter 19 Mathematical Appendix
- 19.1 Sets and Sequences
- 19.1.1 Basic Definitions
- 19.1.2 Basic Set Operations
- 19.2 Functions
- 19.2.1 Basic Definitions
- 19.2.2 Continuity
- 19.3 Calculus and Optimization
- 19.3.1 Basic Definitions
- 19.3.2 Differentiation and Optimization
- 19.3.3 Integration
- 19.4 Probability and Random Variables
- 19.4.1 Basic Definitions
- 19.4.2 Cumulative Distribution and Density Functions
- 19.4.3 Independence, Conditional Probability, and Bayes’ Rule
- 19.4.4 Expected Values
- References
- Index
- 19.1 Sets and Sequences
- Chapter 15 Sequential Rationality with Incomplete Information
- 14.1 Setup: Mechanisms as Bayesian Games
- 13.1 Independent Private Values
- 12.1 Strategic Representation of Bayesian Games
- Chapter 12 Bayesian Games
- 7.1 The Extensive-Form Game
- Chapter 7 Preliminaries
- 6.1 Strategies, Beliefs, and Expected Payoffs
- 5.1 Nash Equilibrium in Pure Strategies
- 4.1 Dominance in Pure Strategies
- 3.1 Normal-Form Games with Pure Strategies
- Chapter 3 Preliminaries
- 2.1 Risk, Nature, and Random Outcomes
- 1.1 Actions, Outcomes, and Preferences
- Chapter 1 The Single-Person Decision Problem
| Erscheinungsjahr: | 2013 |
|---|---|
| Fachbereich: | Allgemeines |
| Genre: | Importe, Wirtschaft |
| Rubrik: | Recht & Wirtschaft |
| Medium: | Buch |
| Inhalt: | Einband - fest (Hardcover) |
| ISBN-13: | 9780691129082 |
| ISBN-10: | 0691129088 |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Einband: | Gebunden |
| Autor: | Tadelis, Steven |
| Hersteller: | Princeton Univers. Press |
| Verantwortliche Person für die EU: | Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, D-36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr@libri.de |
| Abbildungen: | 87 illustrations |
| Maße: | 261 x 217 x 32 mm |
| Von/Mit: | Steven Tadelis |
| Erscheinungsdatum: | 06.01.2013 |
| Gewicht: | 1,06 kg |