Zum Hauptinhalt springen Zur Suche springen Zur Hauptnavigation springen
Beschreibung
TU Games.- Coalitional TU Games and Solutions.- The Core.- Bargaining Sets.- The Prekernel, Kernel, and Nucleolus.- The Prenucleolus.- Geometric Properties of the ?-Core, Kernel, and Prekernel.- The Shapley Value.- Continuity Properties of Solutions.- Dynamic Bargaining Procedures for the Kernel and the Bargaining Set.- NTU Games.- Cooperative Games in Strategic and Coalitional Form.- The Core of NTU Games.- The Shapley NTU Value and the Harsanyi Solution.- The Consistent Shapley Value.- On the Classical Bargaining Set and the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set for NTU Games.- Variants of the Davis-Maschler Bargaining Set for NTU Games.
TU Games.- Coalitional TU Games and Solutions.- The Core.- Bargaining Sets.- The Prekernel, Kernel, and Nucleolus.- The Prenucleolus.- Geometric Properties of the ?-Core, Kernel, and Prekernel.- The Shapley Value.- Continuity Properties of Solutions.- Dynamic Bargaining Procedures for the Kernel and the Bargaining Set.- NTU Games.- Cooperative Games in Strategic and Coalitional Form.- The Core of NTU Games.- The Shapley NTU Value and the Harsanyi Solution.- The Consistent Shapley Value.- On the Classical Bargaining Set and the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set for NTU Games.- Variants of the Davis-Maschler Bargaining Set for NTU Games.
Zusammenfassung
Detailed analysis and unified axiomatic treatment of the main solutions of cooperative games, both with and without side payments
Suitable for introductory and graduate courses on game theory
Inhaltsverzeichnis
TU Games.- Coalitional TU Games and Solutions.- The Core.- Bargaining Sets.- The Prekernel, Kernel, and Nucleolus.- The Prenucleolus.- Geometric Properties of the ?-Core, Kernel, and Prekernel.- The Shapley Value.- Continuity Properties of Solutions.- Dynamic Bargaining Procedures for the Kernel and the Bargaining Set.- NTU Games.- Cooperative Games in Strategic and Coalitional Form.- The Core of NTU Games.- The Shapley NTU Value and the Harsanyi Solution.- The Consistent Shapley Value.- On the Classical Bargaining Set and the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set for NTU Games.- Variants of the Davis-Maschler Bargaining Set for NTU Games.
Details
Erscheinungsjahr: 2010
Fachbereich: Volkswirtschaft
Genre: Recht, Sozialwissenschaften, Wirtschaft
Rubrik: Recht & Wirtschaft
Medium: Taschenbuch
Reihe: Theory and Decision Library C
Inhalt: xx
328 S.
3 s/w Illustr.
328 p. 3 illus.
ISBN-13: 9783642092039
ISBN-10: 3642092039
Sprache: Englisch
Einband: Kartoniert / Broschiert
Autor: Peleg, Bezalel
Sudhölter, Peter
Auflage: Second Edition 2007
Hersteller: Springer
J.B. Metzler
Springer-Verlag GmbH
Theory and Decision Library C
Verantwortliche Person für die EU: Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, D-69121 Heidelberg, juergen.hartmann@springer.com
Maße: 235 x 155 x 20 mm
Von/Mit: Bezalel Peleg (u. a.)
Erscheinungsdatum: 16.11.2010
Gewicht: 0,534 kg
Artikel-ID: 107220517