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Beschreibung
Representationalism grasps the meaning and grammar of linguistic expressions in terms of reference; that is, as determined by the respective objects, concepts or states of affairs they are supposed to represent, and by the internal structure of the content they articulate.
As a consequence, the semantic and grammatical properties of linguistic expressions allegedly reflect the constitution of the objects they refer to. Questions concerning the meaning of particular linguistic expressions are supposed to be answerable by investigating the metaphysics of the corresponding phenomena. Accordingly, questions of the meaning of psychological concepts, are turned into questions of the nature of psychological states. Concerned with Moore's Paradox, representationalist approaches lead into an investigation of the state of affairs supposedly described by Moore-paradoxical assertions, and thus eventually into investigations concerning the metaphysics of belief.
This book argues that this strategy necessarily yields both a wrong solution to Moore's Paradox and an inadequate conception of the meaning of the expression I believe. Turning to the metaphysics of belief is of no use when it comes to understanding either the meaning of the expression 'I believe' or the logic of avowals of belief. Instead, it proposes to focus on the role they play in language, the ways in which they are used in practice.
Representationalism grasps the meaning and grammar of linguistic expressions in terms of reference; that is, as determined by the respective objects, concepts or states of affairs they are supposed to represent, and by the internal structure of the content they articulate.
As a consequence, the semantic and grammatical properties of linguistic expressions allegedly reflect the constitution of the objects they refer to. Questions concerning the meaning of particular linguistic expressions are supposed to be answerable by investigating the metaphysics of the corresponding phenomena. Accordingly, questions of the meaning of psychological concepts, are turned into questions of the nature of psychological states. Concerned with Moore's Paradox, representationalist approaches lead into an investigation of the state of affairs supposedly described by Moore-paradoxical assertions, and thus eventually into investigations concerning the metaphysics of belief.
This book argues that this strategy necessarily yields both a wrong solution to Moore's Paradox and an inadequate conception of the meaning of the expression I believe. Turning to the metaphysics of belief is of no use when it comes to understanding either the meaning of the expression 'I believe' or the logic of avowals of belief. Instead, it proposes to focus on the role they play in language, the ways in which they are used in practice.
Über den Autor
Ulla Schmid, University of Basel, Switzerland.
Details
Erscheinungsjahr: 2017
Genre: Geisteswissenschaften, Kunst, Musik, Philosophie
Jahrhundert: 20. & 21. Jahrhundert
Rubrik: Geisteswissenschaften
Medium: Taschenbuch
Reihe: Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie
Inhalt: Einband - flex.(Paperback)
ISBN-13: 9783110554687
ISBN-10: 3110554682
Sprache: Englisch
Einband: Kartoniert / Broschiert
Autor: Schmid, Ulla
Auflage: 1. Auflage
Hersteller: De Gruyter
Quellen und Studien zur Philosophie
Verantwortliche Person für die EU: De Gruyter [9], Genthiner Str. 13, D-10785 Berlin, orders@degruyter.com
Maße: 230 x 155 x 17 mm
Von/Mit: Ulla Schmid
Erscheinungsdatum: 26.06.2017
Gewicht: 0,443 kg
Artikel-ID: 109381246