Dekorationsartikel gehören nicht zum Leistungsumfang.
Sprache:
Englisch
Regulärer Preis:
inkl. MwSt.
46,35 €
Versandkostenfrei per Post / DHL
Lieferzeit 1-2 Wochen
Kategorien:
Beschreibung
An updated and expanded edition of the classic introduction to PPE-philosophy, politics, and economics-coauthored by one of the field's pioneers
Philosophy, Politics, and Economics offers a complete introduction to the fundamental tools and concepts of analysis that PPE students need to study social and political issues. This fully updated and expanded edition examines the core methodologies of rational choice, strategic analysis, norms, and collective choice that serve as the bedrocks of political philosophy and the social sciences. The textbook is ideal for advanced undergraduates, graduate students, and nonspecialists looking to familiarize themselves with PPE's approaches.
Starting with individual choice, the book develops an account of rationality to introduce readers to decision theory, utility theory, and concepts of welfare economics and consumer choice theory. It moves to strategic choice in game theory to explore such issues as bargaining theory, repeated games, and evolutionary game theory. The text also considers how social norms can be understood, observed, and measured. Concluding chapters address collective choice, social choice theory and democracy, and public choice theory's connections to voters, representatives, and institutions.
Rigorous and comprehensive, Philosophy, Politics, and Economics continues to be an essential text for this popular and burgeoning field.
The only book that covers the entirety of PPE methods
A rigorous, nontechnical introduction to decision theory, game theory, and positive political theory
A philosophical introduction to rational choice theory in the social sciences
Philosophy, Politics, and Economics offers a complete introduction to the fundamental tools and concepts of analysis that PPE students need to study social and political issues. This fully updated and expanded edition examines the core methodologies of rational choice, strategic analysis, norms, and collective choice that serve as the bedrocks of political philosophy and the social sciences. The textbook is ideal for advanced undergraduates, graduate students, and nonspecialists looking to familiarize themselves with PPE's approaches.
Starting with individual choice, the book develops an account of rationality to introduce readers to decision theory, utility theory, and concepts of welfare economics and consumer choice theory. It moves to strategic choice in game theory to explore such issues as bargaining theory, repeated games, and evolutionary game theory. The text also considers how social norms can be understood, observed, and measured. Concluding chapters address collective choice, social choice theory and democracy, and public choice theory's connections to voters, representatives, and institutions.
Rigorous and comprehensive, Philosophy, Politics, and Economics continues to be an essential text for this popular and burgeoning field.
The only book that covers the entirety of PPE methods
A rigorous, nontechnical introduction to decision theory, game theory, and positive political theory
A philosophical introduction to rational choice theory in the social sciences
An updated and expanded edition of the classic introduction to PPE-philosophy, politics, and economics-coauthored by one of the field's pioneers
Philosophy, Politics, and Economics offers a complete introduction to the fundamental tools and concepts of analysis that PPE students need to study social and political issues. This fully updated and expanded edition examines the core methodologies of rational choice, strategic analysis, norms, and collective choice that serve as the bedrocks of political philosophy and the social sciences. The textbook is ideal for advanced undergraduates, graduate students, and nonspecialists looking to familiarize themselves with PPE's approaches.
Starting with individual choice, the book develops an account of rationality to introduce readers to decision theory, utility theory, and concepts of welfare economics and consumer choice theory. It moves to strategic choice in game theory to explore such issues as bargaining theory, repeated games, and evolutionary game theory. The text also considers how social norms can be understood, observed, and measured. Concluding chapters address collective choice, social choice theory and democracy, and public choice theory's connections to voters, representatives, and institutions.
Rigorous and comprehensive, Philosophy, Politics, and Economics continues to be an essential text for this popular and burgeoning field.
The only book that covers the entirety of PPE methods
A rigorous, nontechnical introduction to decision theory, game theory, and positive political theory
A philosophical introduction to rational choice theory in the social sciences
Philosophy, Politics, and Economics offers a complete introduction to the fundamental tools and concepts of analysis that PPE students need to study social and political issues. This fully updated and expanded edition examines the core methodologies of rational choice, strategic analysis, norms, and collective choice that serve as the bedrocks of political philosophy and the social sciences. The textbook is ideal for advanced undergraduates, graduate students, and nonspecialists looking to familiarize themselves with PPE's approaches.
Starting with individual choice, the book develops an account of rationality to introduce readers to decision theory, utility theory, and concepts of welfare economics and consumer choice theory. It moves to strategic choice in game theory to explore such issues as bargaining theory, repeated games, and evolutionary game theory. The text also considers how social norms can be understood, observed, and measured. Concluding chapters address collective choice, social choice theory and democracy, and public choice theory's connections to voters, representatives, and institutions.
Rigorous and comprehensive, Philosophy, Politics, and Economics continues to be an essential text for this popular and burgeoning field.
The only book that covers the entirety of PPE methods
A rigorous, nontechnical introduction to decision theory, game theory, and positive political theory
A philosophical introduction to rational choice theory in the social sciences
Über den Autor
Gerald Gaus and John Thrasher
Inhaltsverzeichnis
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 Rationality
- Rationality and Choice
- What Is Rationality?
- Rationality as Effectiveness
- Subjective Rationality
- Rationality and Sound Belief
- Rational Belief and Choice
- Rationality and Goals
- Actions and Goals
- From Rational Choice to Homo Economicus
- Optimizing—More Is Better than Less
- Decreasing Marginal Value
- The Law of Demand—Downward Sloping Demand Curves
- Self-Interest
- Constrained Maximization
- Conclusion
- Discussion Questions
- 2 Ordinal Utility Theory
- Building Blocks
- Preferences
- Preferences as Tastes or Desires
- Revealed Preferences: The Behavioral Interpretation
- Deliberation, Actions, and Outcomes
- Actions and Outcomes
- Preferences Over Actions
- Ordinal Utility Theory
- Why Accept the Axioms?
- Conclusion
- Discussion Questions
- 3 Cardinal Utility
- Cardinal Utility
- Generating Cardinal Utilities
- Representation of Utility
- Interpersonal Comparisons
- Expected Utility
- Questioning the Axioms
- Continuity
- Better Prizes
- The Allais Paradox
- The Ellsberg Paradox
- Prospect Theory
- Psychology and Expected Utility Theory
- Errors in Probability Judgments
- Framing Effects
- Endowment Effects
- Do These Findings Undermine Expected Utility Theory?
- The Relation Between Utility Theory and Rationality
- Rationality and Maximizing Utility
- Conclusion
- Discussion Questions
- 4 Efficiency and Contract
- Rationality and Efficiency
- Exchange and the Edgeworth Box
- Problems with Pareto Efficiency
- Indeterminacy
- Path-Dependence
- Conflicts Between Efficiency and Rationality
- Efficiency and Welfare
- Markets and Efficiency
- Externalities
- Compensation and Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency
- Welfare, Rights, and the Liberal Paradox
- Property Rights
- Using Rights to Define Externalities
- The Coase Theorem
- Public Goods
- Non-Excludability and the Free-Rider Problem
- Non-Rival Consumption
- Public Goods and State Action
- Homo Economicus or Voluntary Cooperation?
- Conclusion
- Discussion Questions
- 5 Foundations of Game Theory
- Strategic Rationality
- Zero-Sum Games
- Extensive Form Zero-Sum Games
- The Prisoner’s Dilemma
- Rationality and Efficiency
- Public Goods and the Prisoner’s Dilemma
- Coordination Games
- Chicken
- Stag Hunt
- Battle of the Sexes
- Dominance and Rationalizability
- Mixed Strategies
- The Nash Existence Theorem
- Mixed Strategies in a Coordination Game
- Do People Play Nash?
- Subgame Perfection and Backwards Induction
- The Farmer’s Game
- Two Kidnappers
- Backwards Induction
- Gauthier’s Solution
- Nuclear Deterrence
- Commitment
- Conclusion
- Discussion Questions
- 6 Advanced Topics in Game Theory
- Repeated Games
- Tit-for-Tat and the Evolution of Cooperation
- The Folk Theorem
- The Evolution of Direct Reciprocity
- Evolutionary Games
- Hawk-Dove Game
- Evolutionary Stable Strategies
- Asymmetries and the Origin of Property Rights
- Polymorphic Equilibria
- ESS and Nash
- Evolutionary Game Theory and Rationality
- Signaling
- Bargaining Theory
- Conclusion
- Discussion Questions
- 7 Conventions, Norms, and Institutions
- Conventions
- Conventions and Coordination
- How Do Conventions Emerge?
- Common Knowledge
- Conventions and Arbitrariness
- Convention and Contract
- Social Norms
- What Norms Do
- Norms and Cooperation
- Norms and Nash
- Bad Norms
- Institutions
- Two Types of Institutions
- Institutions and Transaction Costs
- Conclusion
- Discussion Questions
- 8 Social Choice Theory
- The Problem of Social Choice
- Social Choice Theory
- Collective Rationality
- May’s Theorem and Majority Rule
- May’s Conditions
- May’s Argument
- Arrow’s Theorem
- Condorcet Voting and Its Paradox
- Arrow’s Conditions
- The First Stage of the Theorem: From Local Semi-Decisiveness to Global Decisiveness
- The Second Stage of the Theorem: Finding the Dictator
- Representation and Coherence
- The Importance of Arrow’s Theorem
- Does Arrow’s Theorem Challenge Democracy?
- Dimensionality
- Collective Choice Rules
- Problems of Collective Choice Rules
- Extending Social Choice Rules
- Condorcet Method
- A Weakly Positional Method: Plurality
- A Strongly Positional Method: Borda Count
- Cardinal Methods
- Elimination Methods
- What to Choose?
- Path Dependency and Agenda Manipulation
- Path Dependency in Legislation
- Agenda Control in the Flying Club
- Strategic Voting
- Other Examples of Strategic Voting
- Logrolling: Vote Trading in Legislatures
- The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
- Conclusion
- Discussion Questions
- 9 Public Choice and Democracy
- Basic Spatial Model of Democracy
- Uncertainty and Ideology
- The Simple Spatial Model
- Complicating the Basic Spatial Model
- The Plurality Rule and the Two-Party System
- Choosing the Rules
- Unanimity
- Bicameralism
- Logrolling and Making Everyone Worse Off
- Intertemporal Coalitions
- Homo Economicus and the Symmetry Assumption
- Voting and Rationality
- Non-Electoral Utility
- The Act and Expression of Voting
- Conclusion
- Discussion Questions
- Bibliography
- Index
- Basic Spatial Model of Democracy
- Conventions
- Repeated Games
- Cardinal Utility
Details
| Erscheinungsjahr: | 2021 |
|---|---|
| Fachbereich: | Allgemeines |
| Genre: | Importe, Philosophie |
| Jahrhundert: | Antike |
| Rubrik: | Geisteswissenschaften |
| Thema: | Lexika |
| Medium: | Taschenbuch |
| Inhalt: | Einband - flex.(Paperback) |
| ISBN-13: | 9780691219790 |
| ISBN-10: | 0691219796 |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Einband: | Kartoniert / Broschiert |
| Autor: |
Gaus, Gerald
Thrasher, John |
| Hersteller: | Princeton University Press |
| Verantwortliche Person für die EU: | Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, D-36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr@libri.de |
| Maße: | 234 x 156 x 20 mm |
| Von/Mit: | Gerald Gaus (u. a.) |
| Erscheinungsdatum: | 16.11.2021 |
| Gewicht: | 0,577 kg |