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He fleshes out a model in which each party is composed of three different factions concerned with winning, with policy, and with publicity. Parties compete with one another. When internal bargaining is combined with external competition, a natural equilibrium emerges, which Roemer calls party-unanimity Nash equilibrium.
Assuming only the distribution of voter preferences and the endowments of the population, he deduces the nature of the parties that will form. He then applies the theory to several empirical puzzles, including income distribution, patterns of electoral success, and why there is no labor party in the United States.
He fleshes out a model in which each party is composed of three different factions concerned with winning, with policy, and with publicity. Parties compete with one another. When internal bargaining is combined with external competition, a natural equilibrium emerges, which Roemer calls party-unanimity Nash equilibrium.
Assuming only the distribution of voter preferences and the endowments of the population, he deduces the nature of the parties that will form. He then applies the theory to several empirical puzzles, including income distribution, patterns of electoral success, and why there is no labor party in the United States.
| Erscheinungsjahr: | 2006 |
|---|---|
| Medium: | Taschenbuch |
| Inhalt: | Einband - flex.(Paperback) |
| ISBN-13: | 9780674021051 |
| ISBN-10: | 0674021053 |
| Sprache: | Englisch |
| Einband: | Kartoniert / Broschiert |
| Autor: | John E Roemer |
| Hersteller: | Harvard University Press |
| Verantwortliche Person für die EU: | preigu GmbH & Co. KG, Lengericher Landstr. 19, D-49078 Osnabrück, mail@preigu.de |
| Maße: | 225 x 167 x 18 mm |
| Von/Mit: | John E Roemer |
| Erscheinungsdatum: | 07.04.2006 |
| Gewicht: | 0,51 kg |
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