This book addresses two questions - why some political systems have more centralized systems of interpersonal redistribution than others, and why some political unions make larger efforts to equalize resources among their constituent units than others. This book presents a new theory of the origin of fiscal structures in systems with several levels of government. The argument points to two major factors to account for the variation in redistribution: the interplay between economic geography and political representation on the one hand, and the scope of interregional economic externalities on the other. To test the empirical implications derived from the argument, the book relies on in-depth studies of the choice of fiscal structures in unions as diverse as the European Union, Canada and the United States in the aftermath of the Great Depression; Germany before and after Reunification; and Spain after the transition to democracy.
This book addresses two questions - why some political systems have more centralized systems of interpersonal redistribution than others, and why some political unions make larger efforts to equalize resources among their constituent units than others. This book presents a new theory of the origin of fiscal structures in systems with several levels of government. The argument points to two major factors to account for the variation in redistribution: the interplay between economic geography and political representation on the one hand, and the scope of interregional economic externalities on the other. To test the empirical implications derived from the argument, the book relies on in-depth studies of the choice of fiscal structures in unions as diverse as the European Union, Canada and the United States in the aftermath of the Great Depression; Germany before and after Reunification; and Spain after the transition to democracy.
Über den Autor
Pablo Beramendi is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Duke University. His research focuses on the political economy of redistribution and inequality. Previously, he has taught at the Maxwell School of Syracuse University and at the Department of Politics at the University of Oxford. He is also a research associate at the Juan March Institute (Madrid) and a former research Fellow at the Science Center (Berlin). Among his published work are articles on the determinants of taxation and inequality; the role of inequality in shaping electoral turnout; and the relationship between federalism, inequality, and redistribution.
Zusammenfassung
This is a book about redistribution and inequality in political unions, a form of democracy that involves several levels of government and that encompasses about one third of the population living under democracy around the world.
Inhaltsverzeichnis
1. Regions and redistribution: introduction and overview; 2. A theory of fiscal structures in political unions; 3. The road ahead: the empirical strategy; 4. The European Union: economic geography and fiscal structures under centrifugal representation; 5. North America's divide: distributive tensions, risk sharing, and the centralization of public insurance in federations; 6. Germany's reunification: distributive tensions and fiscal structures under centripetal representation; 7. Endogenous decentralization and welfare resilience: Spain, 1978-2007; 8. The political geography of inequality: summary and implications.
