Urban Economics and Fiscal Policy

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Beschreibung

"With more than half of today's global GDP being produced by approximately four hundred metropolitan centers, learning about the economics of cities is vital to understanding economic prosperity. This textbook introduces graduate and upper-division undergraduate students to the field of urban economics and fiscal policy, relying on a modern approach that integrates theoretical and empirical analysis. Based on material that Holger Sieg has taught at the University of Pennsylvania, Urban Economics and Fiscal Policy brings the most recent insights from the field into the classroom. Divided into short chapters, the book explores fiscal policies that directly shape economic issues in cities, such as city taxes, the provision of quality education, access to affordable housing, and protection from crime and natural hazards. For each issue, Sieg offers questions, facts, and background; illuminates how economic theory helps students engage with topics; and presents empirical data that shows how economic ideas play out in daily life. Throughout, the book pushes readers to think critically and immediately put what they are learning to use by applying cutting-edge theory to data"--

Über den Autor

Holger Sieg

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Preface
Acknowledgments
1. Introduction
- 1.1 Why Cities?
- 1.2 New York City versus the United States of America
- 1.3 The City as a Public Sector Corporation
- 1.4 An International Perspective
- 1.5 Moving Forward
- 1.6 Problem Sets
I. The Economic Rationale of Cities
- 2. Agglomeration, Productivity, and Trade
  - 2.1 Motivation
  - 2.2 Economic Rationales for Geographic Concentration
    - 2.2.1 Transportation, Commuting, and Communication Costs
    - 2.2.2 Economies of Scale and Scope
    - 2.2.3 Knowledge Spillovers and Agglomeration Externalities
  - 2.3 Modeling Agglomeration Externalities
  - 2.4 Transportation Costs and Trade
  - 2.5 Measuring the Impact of Agglomeration Externalities on Firm Productivity
  - 2.6 The Local Nature of Agglomeration Externalities
  - 2.7 The Effects of Government Regulations
  - 2.8 A Case Study: The Impact of Brexit on the City of London
  - 2.9 Conclusions
  - 2.10 Technical Appendix: Cost Functions
    - 2.10.1 Cost-Efficient Production and Competition
    - 2.10.2 Multiple Input Factors
  - 2.11 Debate: Amazon’s Second HQ
  - 2.12 Problem Sets
  - 3. Fiscal Federalism and Decentralization
    - 3.1 Motivation
    - 3.2 A Brief History of Legal Doctrines of Federalism in the US
    - 3.3 Fiscal Federalism
    - 3.4 Centralization
    - 3.5 The Budget of the Federal Government
    - 3.6 A Case Study: Federal Flood Insurance
    - 3.7 Decentralization
    - 3.8 Heterogeneity in Preferences over Policies
      - 3.8.1 Testing the Central Tenet of Economic Federalism
      - 3.8.2 Heterogeneity in Education Policies among US States
      - 3.8.3 Heterogeneity in Fiscal Policies among the Largest US Cities
    - 3.9 Social Learning and Experimentation
    - 3.10 A Case Study: Special Economic Zones
    - 3.11 Conclusions
    - 3.12 Technical Appendix: Deriving Optimal Policies
    - 3.13 Debate: Flood Insurance
    - 3.14 Problem Sets
    - II. Efficient and Voluntary Provision of Public Goods in Cities
      - 4. Efficient Provision of Local Public Goods and Services
        4.1 Motivation
        4.2 Efficient Public Good Provision
        4.2.1 Defining Local Public Goods
        4.2.2 Pure Public Goods
        4.2.3 Congestion
        4.3 Implementation and Mechanism Design
        4.3.1 The Lindahl Mechanism
        4.3.2 The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism
        4.4 Stated Preferences over Public Good Provision
        4.5 Practical Implementation: Optimal Class Size
        4.6 A Case Study: Berlin Brandenburg Airport
        4.7 Conclusions
        4.8 Technical Appendix A: Deriving the Optimality Conditions for the Baseline Model
        4.9 Technical Appendix B: Deriving the Optimality Conditions for the Model with Congestion
        4.10 Technical Appendix C: Applying the VCG Mechanism
        4.10.1 The Planner’s Problem
        4.10.2 Side Payments
        4.10.3 Taxes
        4.10.4 Incentives to Tell the Truth
        4.11 Debate: Efficient Cities
        4.12 Problem Sets
        5. Voluntary Provision of Local Public Goods and Services
        5.1 Motivation
        5.2 A Model of Voluntary Provision of Public Goods
        5.3 Empirical Evidence of Crowd-Out
        5.4 Warm Glow and Private Benefits
        5.5 Empirical Evidence: Private Benefits versus Warm Glow
        5.6 Tax Incentives and Matching
        5.7 Conclusions
        5.8 Technical Appendix: Deriving the Nash Equilibrium
        5.9 Debate: Tax Deductibility of Charitable Donations
        5.10 Problem Sets
        III. Political Economy of State and Local Governments
        6. Local Political Institutions in the US
        6.1 Motivation
        6.2 A Brief History of Local Governments in the US
        6.3 Characterizing Municipal Governments in the US
        6.4 Legal Foundations of Municipal Governments
        6.5 Direct Democracy
        6.5.1 Initiative, Referendum, and Recall
        6.5.2 A Case Study: Fracking in Athens, Ohio
        6.6 Representative Democracy
        6.6.1 Local Forms of Government
        6.6.2 Partisan versus Nonpartisan Elections
        6.6.3 A Case Study: Electoral Reform in Asheville, NC
        6.6.4 Term Limits
        6.7 Conclusions
        6.8 Debate: Mayor-Council versus Council-Manager
        6.9 Problem Sets
        7. Voting over Local Public Good Provision
        7.1 Motivation
        7.2 Majority Rule in a Direct Democracy
        7.2.1 The Median Voter Theorem
        7.2.2 Sequential Voting
        7.2.3 Vote Buying, Vote Trading, and Log Rolling
        7.3 Representative Democracy
        7.4 Is the Median-Income Voter Decisive? Empirical Evidence
        7.5 Discussion
        7.5.1 Dimensionality of the Policy Space
        7.5.2 Ideology and Competence
        7.5.3 Accountability and Competence
        7.5.4 Voter Turnout
        7.6 A Case Study: The Role of Money in State and Local Politics
        7.7 Conclusions
        7.8 Technical Appendix: The Public Good Provision Problem
        7.9 Debate: City Politics
        7.10 Problem Sets
        8. Household Mobility and Fiscal Competition
        8.1 Motivation
        8.2 Sorting and Competition among Municipalities
        8.3 Capitalization: Empirical Evidence
        8.4 Competition and Efficiency: Empirical Evidence
        8.5 A Case Study: The Benefits of Consolidation
        8.6 Income Stratification and Voting
        8.7 Segregation and Sorting by Race
        8.8 Conclusions
        8.9 Technical Appendix: Optimal Locational Choices
        8.9.1 Modeling Fiscal Competition
        8.9.2 Imperfect Sorting by Income
        8.10 Debate: City-County Merger
        8.11 Problem Sets
        9. Spillovers, Fiscal Inequality, and Intergovernmental Transfers
        9.1 Motivation
        9.2 Heterogeneity in Intergovernmental Transfers among the Largest US Cities
        9.3 Fiscal Spillover Effects
        9.4 Inequality and Fairness
        9.5 Different Types of Intergovernmental Grants
        9.6 Poverty and Intergovernmental Transfers
        9.7 Conclusions
        9.8 Technical Appendix: Solving the Model with Spillovers
        9.9 Debate: School Finance Equalization Laws
        9.10 Problem Sets
        10. Rent-Seeking Behavior
        10.1 Motivation
        10.2 Modeling Rent-Seeking Behavior
        10.3 Empirical Evidence
        10.3.1 State Bond Ratings
        10.3.2 Corruption and Accountability: Evidence from Brazil
        10.4 A Case Study: Procurement Auctions in Puerto Rico
        10.5 Conclusions
        10.6 Technical Appendix: Computing the Equilibrium of the All-Pay Auction
        10.7 Debate: Term Limits
        10.8 Problem Sets
        11. Labor Relations and Collective Bargaining
        11.1 Motivation
        11.2 Employer and Union Rights and Obligations
        11.3 The Theory of Bargaining and Negotiations
        11.3.1 A Bargaining Model
        11.3.2 Employment and Wage Negotiations
        11.3.3 Discussion
        11.4 Components of Municipal Labor Policy
        11.4.1 Wages and Salaries
        11.4.2 Employment and Work Rules
        11.4.3 Benefits and Pension Funding
        11.5 Funding of Pension Plans
        11.6 A Case Study: Collective Bargaining in Philadelphia
        11.7 Conclusions
        11.8 Technical Appendix: A Bargaining Model
        11.9 Debate: Pay-as-You-Go
        11.10 Problem Sets
        IV. The Determination of City Taxes
        12. Property Taxation
        12.1 Motivation
        12.2 Justifications of the Property Tax
        12.2.1 The Property Tax as a Benefit Tax
        12.2.2 The Property Tax as a Tax on Capital
        12.2.3 The Impact of Property Taxes on Renters
        12.2.4 Fairness
        12.2.5 Other Administrative Advantages
        12.3 Property Tax Compliance
        12.3.1 Some Evidence
        12.3.2 Modeling Property Tax Compliance Behavior
        12.3.3 The Effectiveness of Nudge Strategies
        12.4 Property Tax Limitations and Commercial Property Tax Exemptions
        12.5 Alternatives to the Property Tax
        12.5.1 Is a Land Tax a Better Alternative?
        12.5.2 A Case Study: The Soda Tax in Philadelphia
        12.6 Conclusions
        12.7 Debate: Property versus Income Taxation
        12.8 Problem Sets
        13. Business Taxation and Economic Development
        13.1 Motivation
        13.2 Empirical Evidence on Firm Sorting
        13.3 A Model of Firm Location Choices
        13.4 Tax Policy and Firm Location
        13.5 Business Taxation in Practice
        13.6 Tax Increment Financing and Community Development
        13.7 A Case Study: The Relocation of UBS
        13.8 Conclusions
        13.9 Technical Appendix: The Derivation of the Profit Function
        13.10 Debate: Reforming Business Taxation
        13.11 Problem Sets
        V. The Practice of Urban Fiscal Policies
        14. Municipal Budgeting and Planning
        14.1 Motivation
        14.2 Priorities and Mission Statement
        14.3 Operating Budget
        14.3.1 Revenues
        14.3.2 Expenses
        14.3.3 Flexible Budgets
        14.4 Capital Budget
        14.5 Forecasting
        14.5.1 Revenue Forecasting
        14.5.2 Cost and Expenditure Forecasting
        14.6 Benefit-Cost Analysis
        14.7 Conclusions
        14.8 Debate: Hosting the Super Bowl
        14.9 Problem Sets
        15. Fiscal Policies and Fiscal Crisis
        15.1 Motivation
        15.2 Data
        15.3 Expenditure Policies
        15.4 Revenue Policies
        15.5 Common Policy Mistakes
        15.5.1 Labor Policies
        15.5.2 Redistribution and Tax Policies
        15.5.3 Economic Development Policies
        15.6...

Details

Erscheinungsjahr:	2020
Fachbereich:	Allgemeines
Genre:	Importe , Wirtschaft
Rubrik:	Recht & Wirtschaft
Medium:	Buch
Inhalt:	Einband - fest (Hardcover)
ISBN-13:	9780691190846
ISBN-10:	0691190844
Sprache:	Englisch
Einband:	Gebunden
Autor:	Sieg, Holger
Hersteller:	Princeton University Press
Verantwortliche Person für die EU:	Libri GmbH, Europaallee 1, D-36244 Bad Hersfeld, gpsr@libri.de
Maße:	263 x 191 x 37 mm
Von/Mit:	Holger Sieg
Erscheinungsdatum:	04.08.2020
Gewicht:	1,12 kg